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JN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:
:

DEVON KENNE,

Case No. 20040955-CA

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR IN THE REASONABLE
DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel
articulated to the court "I accept eveiything" relating to the jury instructions. Brief of the
Appellee at p. 9.
The State fails to cite any authority indicating that invited error pertains to unsettled
areas of law. In fact, People v. Hodges. 2005 WL 1645760 Tf 25, Colo.App.,2005, states that
"...where an error or omission injury instructions is attributable to inadvertence or attorney
incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review for plain error rather
than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error."

Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of
invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, federal caselaw provides guidance. The
federal courts have expanded upon the concept of exceptional circumstances, as argued in
Appellant's opening brief and utilized in Utah courts, to include a "plain error" concept at
the stage of appeal. The United States Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. United
States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that "...where the law
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is
enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. The United States
Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a
long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by
existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. United States v. Retos.
analyzed this issue and explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error was
plain at time of tried, but whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct appeal.
25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport. Inc.. the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies to jury
instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in
reliance on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we
will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because at the
time of trial the reasonable doubt jury instruction on which Appellant's counsel was relying
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was a settled area of law. See, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However,
at the time of direct appeal the law for which the instruction had relied on was abandoned as
unconstitutional. See, State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of the
substantial change in the lawfromthe time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the change
to the reasonable doubt jury instruction should be reviewed under either Utah's "exceptional
circumstances" rubric or the "plain error" doctrine, as outlined in Johnson. Retos, and West
Indies supra, and not the invited error doctrine.
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did
not know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in the Reyes' case at the
time of the trial in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true
given that two other cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45, and State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, were
argued the same day as Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both Cruz and Weaver were
arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights
by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions.
Even those parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what that outcome would
be given that the cases argued at the same time were taking opposing positions to Reyes1.
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent. See, e.g.,
Hodges. Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally agreed with the reasonable doubt jury

1

The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper
standard to the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein.
3

instruction because she was unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes would be. It was
not possible to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reves was pending,
See e.g. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to
object at trial was inadvertent and should be reviewed under Johnson's "plain error" standard
or Utah's exceptional circumstances rubric, as argued in Appellant's opening brief.
Although Appellant's counsel did not object to the jury instruction at trial, there were
exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would result.
Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "eliminate all
reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based
on a degree of proof that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in
criminal matters. See Reyes. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellant
to be found guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
violated his due process rights and therefore, created a situation of substantial injustice,
allowing exceptional circumstances to apply. As the Appellant's liberty is at stake and this
issue is constitutional, the appellate court is "...obliged to consider it even though it was not
raised in the trial court." State v. Jamesoa 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This unsettled
interpretation of the law colored the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the issue at
trial, resulting an exceptional circumstance or Johnson's "plain error."
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II. APPELLANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILURE
TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
In the State's Appellee's Brief, the State argues that Appellant's trial counsel was not
ineffective based on her failure to move for a directed verdict after the denial of her motion
to dismiss. Brief of Appellee p. 13. The State erroneously relies upon State v. Robertson.
2005 UT APP 415, f 14 as support; however, Robertson only indicates that Robertson
"moved to dismiss the charges or for a directed verdict," in the trial court. The Utah Court
of Appeals did not render a determination, nor is this issue even before the court in
Robertson.
Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts have
consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. Washington.
466 U.S. 668,104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to
showfirstthat his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner
and that said performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment; and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at
687; State v.Kelley, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516,
521 (Utah 1994).
Utah courts routinely consider motions to dismiss separate and distinctfrommotions
for directed verdict. As its name implies, "a motion for a directed verdict under rule 50(a)
contemplates only jury trials". See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250,252
(Utah 1985). In the context of a bench trial, the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is
5

a motion for involuntary dismissal under UT. R. Crv. P. 41(B). See Id., Bair v. Axiom
Design. L.L.C.. 20 P.3d 388 (Utah, 2001).
The Utah Supreme Court provides that a motion to dismiss is made at the close of the
Statefs case and a motion for directed verdict is made at the close of all the evidence. State
v. Adamson. 125 P.2d 429 (Utah 1942). UT. R. CRIM. P. 17(o), provides that "[a]t the
conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the
court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof,
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged
therein or any lesser included offense." State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267, (Utah App.,1993).
The standard for a directed verdict is that 'the court must decide whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Wilkins v. Packerware Corp. Slip
Copy, 2005 WL 1528670D.Kan., 2005.
The timing of these motions is not the only characterization that distinguishes these
motions from one another. Courts have imposed a separate standard for granting motions
for directed verdicts than for motions to dismiss. When determining whether a motion for
directed verdict should be granted, courts look to whether there is sufficient evidence to give
the case to the jury. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). When considered a
motion to dismiss, the courts consider whether the state has proven all of the necessary
elements to make a prima facie case. State v. Milne. 124 P.2d 540 (Utah 1942).
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In it's brief, the State argues that a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict
are "for all practical purposes identical." Appellee's BriefdX^. 13. However, Utah routinely
holds motions to dismiss and motions for directed verdict as two separate and distinct
motions. A motion for a directed verdict applies only to a jury trial, were a motion to dismiss
applies only to a bench trial. Further, Utah Appellate Courts do not recognize these motions
as identical or interchangeable. As this was a jury trial, Appellant's counsel was ineffective
for arguing a motion to dismiss when she should have requested a motion for directed
verdict. A motion to dismiss did not apply to this matter since it was a jury trial. The jury
was the fact finder in this matter and not the judge, therefore a motion for directed verdict
should have been made. Because counsel did not argue for a motion for directed verdict,
Appellant was convicted of a crime of which he may have been acquitted.
Appellant's trial counsel spent her entire motion arguing that the State failed to meet
its burden because it did not establish defendant's intent, when she should have been arguing
that the State failed to meet its burden because it did not sufficiently establish that the crimes
committed were linked to defendant. Throughout the entire trial, the State was unable to
establish through reliable witnesses that it was the defendant who committed these crimes.
This deficient motion prejudiced Appellant by eliminating any opportunity for the court to
enter its own judgment on whether the State had proven its case in light of the inconsistent
and unreliable evidence the State produced at trial. The trial court acknowledged at the end
of the State's case that a conviction was as "long of a shot" as the Judge had seen in a long
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time. This demonstrates a likelihood that the court believed the State had not met its burden
or that it was at least questionable whether the State had proved its case. Tr. 148.
In a jury trial it is the judge who must determine if there is enough evidence to send
the case to the jury if a motion for directed verdict is brought. In this matter, it appears that
the court was questionable on if there was enough evidence to convict. Therefore,
Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective because she did not move for a motion for directed
verdict. If she had, it is possible that the court may not of found that there was enough
evidence and dismissed the case because of the difference in the standard of the motions and
the court's questionability of the evidence.
The State argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss should have demonstrated
that the State had sufficient evidence for a jury to convict. Although the trial court may have
determined there was sufficient evidence to deny the motion to dismiss, it was not given the
opportunity to hear a motion for directed verdict since Appellant's counsel did not move or
argue the standard for one, and the trial court did not make a judgment as to the sufficiency
of the evidence based upon the standard for a motion for directed verdict. Had the trial court
been allowed to review the evidence under the standard of a motion for directed verdict, there
is sufficient reason to believe it may have granted the motion and the charges against the
Appellant may have been dismissed.
Even if the trial court had determined that trial counsel's motion to dismiss could be
construed to be the same as a motion for directed verdict, trial counsel's motion was deficient
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in its content thereby denying defendant effective assistance of counsel.

Trial counsel's

motion and the court's response states in relevant part:
COUNSEL: Well, I don't think that they have shown evidence as far as the
intent or the purpose in any of these counts. First of all, on the burglary, that
there was an intent before entering the residence.
THE COURT: Well it says - the statute says "enters or remains." So if at any
time, while inside, you have an intent to commit a theft, it's a burglary.
COUNSEL: Okay. And then on the theft with the - with the purpose of
depriving, there hasn't been any evidence shown that - that the vehicle was not
just being temporarily borrowed, that - you know, that it wasn't being returned
to the owner... Okay on the receiving stolen vehicle, there has to be the intent
to procure the motor vehicle. I don't -1 don't think they've shown that, but
well, I think they've - they have tried to put some evidence in on that. And
then on the paraphernalia on the - they haven't shown any intent to use the
paraphernalia.
Tr. 141-142. This colloquy between Appellant's trial counsel and the court shows that
Appellant's trial counsel did not attempt to argue that there was no reliable evidence
whatever to show that the Appellant committed the crimes of which he was charged.
Therefore, because she did not argue as to whether the evidence was sufficient to be sent to
the jury or make a motion of directed verdict she rendered ineffective assistance to Appellant.
Trial counsel's motion fell below the reasonable standards ofprofessional judgment and said
judgment prejudiced the defendant.
In short, trial counsel deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel when she
failed to move for directed verdict thereby depriving the court of determination under the
correct standard. Trial counsel should have moved for a directed verdict based on the fact
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that the State failed to prove that it had sufficient evidence to link the Appellant to the
crimes, and should have made a motion for a directed verdict. In the event that this Court
rules that trial counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed as a motion for directed verdict, trial
counsel's motion and argument in support of the motion was so deficient that it deprived
Appellant of effective assistance of counsel and sufficiently prejudiced the outcome of
Appellant's case.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment,
DATED this 14th day of November, 2005,

Andrew Fitzgerald
Attorney for Devon Kinne
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that the State failed to prove that it had sufficient evidence to link the Appellant to the
crimes, and should have made a motion for a directed verdict.

In the event that this

Court rules that trial counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed as a motion for directed verdict,
trial counsel's motion and argument in support of the motion was so deficient that il
deprived Appellant of effective assistance of counsel and sufficiently prejudiced the
outcome of Appellant's case,
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2005.

Andrew Fitzge^i
Attorney for Devon Kinne

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 14 day of November, 2005,1 mailed, first class
postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to:
Ms. Joanne C. Slotnik
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of November, 2005,1 mailed, first class postage
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to:
Ms. Joanne C. Slotnik
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

11

